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THE EXTENT OF THE JUDICIAL POWER
OF THE UNITED STATES
In marking out the powers of the three departments of the
government of the United States, quite different forms of expres-
sion are employed.
Art. i, Sec. i, declares that "All legislative Powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States." Art.
i, Sec. 8, provides that "The Congress shall have Power to" pass
laws on certain specified subjects, and also "all Laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or officer
thereof."
Art. II, Sec. i, declares that "The Executive Power shall be
vested in a President of the United States of America ;" and that
he shall take an oath that he will faithfully execute the office "of
President of the United States." Art. II, Sections 2 and 3, confer
upon him certain specified powers, one being that "he shall take
care that the Laws be faithfully executed."
Art. III, declares (Sec. i.) that "The judicial Power of the
United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish;" and (Sec. 2) that
"The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority ;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
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Ministers and Consuls ;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction ;--to Controversies to which the United States shall
be a Party ;-to Controversies between two or more States ;-
between a State and Citizens of another State ;--between Citizens
of different States ;--between Citizens of the same State claiming
Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or
the citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects."
"In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, The Supreme
Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases
before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdic-
tion, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under
such Regulations as the Congress shall make."
The Tenth Amendment provides that "The powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people."
In legal theory, the people of the several States of the United
States, by the action of a majority of the people in each State
taken within that State, delegated certain powers, which either
these States or peoples or the whole people of the United States
had theretofore possessed, to the United States of America.
It was not clear, on the face of the Tenth Amendment, whether
in the provision that the powers not so delegated were reserved
to the States respectively or to the people, the word "people"
meant the people of the States respectively, or the people of the
United States as a whole.
The phrase "or to the people" was added to the draft of the
Amendment as originally reported to the first Congress, on the
motion of Roger Sherman, and without debate. He probably
designed to leave what these words meant to be settled later by
the courts. To have made the alternative reservation expressly
to the people of the United States would have been unpalatable to
the small States. To have made it expressly to the people of each
State respectively would have been unpalatable to the nationalists.
In framing the Constitution of the Confederate States of
America, adopted March ii, i86i, the language of the Tenth
Amendment was incorporated, with the addition at the end of the
word "thereof ;" and in the same spirit the language of the Ninth
Amendment was incorporated with the addition at the end of the
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words "of the several States."' It is significant that while these
changes were obviously made in the interest of the "States"
Rights" doctrine, no substantial alteration was introduced in
following the terms of Art. III of the Constitution of the United
States respecting the establishment of the Judicial power.
It may safely be said that those who framed that instrument
meant to have it both create and define that power, and that the
people in adopting it believed that this had been done. None of
those who spoke against its ratification in the State Conventions
ever claimed that any judicial powers were granted except those
expressly enumerated, and such as were properly incident to them.
It was argued with great force that some of the enumerated
powers were too broad, but no one suggested that there were other
powers, inherent in sovereignty, which the government, as re-
constituted, would therefore possess. Had it been suggested and
generally admitted, the Constitution would, in all probability,
never have been ratified.
James Wilson, in the Pennsylvania Convention, gave particular
attention to the defence of the scheme of a Federal judiciary, and
assumed from the outset that it made specific grants of authority.
"Upon a distinct examination," he said, "of the different powers,
I presume it will be found that not one of them is unnecessary.
I will go farther-there is not one of them but will be discovered
to be of such a nature as to be attended with very important
advantages." 2
The Federalist treated the subject in a similar way. In No.
LXXX, after a discussion of the principles that ought a priori to
regulate the constitution of the Federal judiciary, Publius (i. e.
Hamilton) continues thus: "We will proceed to test by these
principles the particular powers of which, according to the plan
of the Convention, it is to be composed."
The provisions made having been then stated, he observes that
"This constitutes the entire mass of the judicial authority of the
United States." He then examines each provision by itself, and
concludes thus:
"From this review of the particular powers of the federal
judiciary, as marked out in the constitution, it appears, that they
are all conformable to the principles which ought to have governed
1 Davis, Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, T, 672; Cf. ibid.,
146, 158.
2 Elliot's Debates, II, 486.
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the structure of that department, and which were necessary to the
perfection of that system."
Continuing the discussion in No. LXXXI, he says that "The
amount of the observations hitherto made on the authority of the
judicial department is this: That it has been carefully restricted
to those causes which are manifestly proper for the cognizance of
the national judicature."
In No. LXXXIII, after remarking that Congress has only cer-
tain enumerated powers and no general legislative authority, he
makes this explicit observation:
"In like manner, the authority of the federal judicatures, is
declared by the constitution to comprehend certain cases par-
ticularly specified. The expression of those cases, marks the
precise limits beyond which the federal courts cannot extend their
jurisdiction; because the objects of their cognizance being enumer-
ated, the specification would be nugatory, if it did not exclude all
ideas of more extensive authority."
In Chisholm v. Georgia, Justice Jay, after premising that
the preamble of the Constitution declared one of its main purposes
was to "establish justice," proceeded thus:
"It may be asked, what is the precise sense and latitude in
which the -words 'to establish justice,' as here used, are to be
understood? The answer to this question will result from" the
provisions made in the Constitution on this head. They are
specified in the 2d section of the .3d article, where it is ordained,
that the judicial power- of the United States shall extend to ten
descriptions of cases, viz. Ist. To all cases arising under this
Constitution; because the meaning, construction, and operation of
a compact ought always to be ascertained by all the parties, or 3 by
authority derived only from one of them. 2d. To all cases arising
under the laws of the United States; because as such laws con-
stitutionally made, are obligatory on each State, the measure of
obligation and obedience ought not to be decided and fixed by the
party from whom they are due, but by a tribunal deriving
authority from both the parties."
Then follows a similar statement of each remaining one of the
ten grants, with its justification, concluding in these words:
"Even this cursory view of the judicial powers of the United
States, leaves the mind strongly impressed with the importance
3 Ru. Should or read not?
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of them to the preservation of the tranquility, the equal
sovereignty, and the equal right of the people. ' 4
Mr. Justice Story, in speaking for the court in the great case
of Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, after saying that the language of
the Constitution requires Congress to vest the whole judicial power
of the United States in their courts, proceeds thus:
"It being then established that the language of this clause is
imperative, the next question i.; as to the cases to which it shall
apply. The answer is found in the Constitution itself. The
judicial power shall extend to all the cases enumerated in the Con-
stitution."
So Daniel Webster, a few years later, observed in the House of
Representatives that "the Constitution defines what shall be the
objects of judicial power, ' and Mr. Justice Miller, in his lec-
tures on the Constitution, given in 1889, remarks that Art. III,
Sec. II, "defines or marks out the judicial power of the United
States by providing to what case it may extend."
It would seem that both on principle and authority this doctrine
must be sound; but it is difficult to reconcile it with some observa-
tions in the recent case of Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S., 46.
"By reason of the fact," says the court (pp. 8I, 82) through
Mr. Justice Brewer, "that there is no general grant of legislative
power it has become an accepted constitutional rule that this is a
government of enumerated powers." . . . "On the other
hand, in Article III, which treats of the judicial department-and
this is important for our present consideration-we find that sec-
tion i reads that 'the judicial power of the United States, shall
be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts at,
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.' By
this is granted the entire judicial power of the Nation. Section
2, which provides that 'the judicial power shall extend to all cases,
in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the
United States,' etc., is not a limitation nor an enumeration. It is a
definite declaration, a provision that the judicial power shall
extend to-that is, shall include-the several matters particularly
mentioned, leaving unrestricted the general grant of the entire
judicial power. There may be, of course, limitations on that
4 2 Dallas, 475, 476.
5 Elliot's Debates, IV, 478.
Miller on the Constitution of the United States, 337.
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grant of power, but if there are any they must be expressed, for
otherwise the general grant would vest in the courts all the
judicial power which the new Nation was capable of exercising."
"Speaking generally," the opinion proceeds, (p. 83) "it may be
observed that the judicial power of a nation extends to all contro-
versies justiciable in their nature the parties to which or the
property involved in which may be reached by judicial process;
and when the judicial power of the United States was vested in
the Supreme and other courts all the judicial power which the
Nation was capable of exercising was vested in those tribunals,
and unless there be some limitations expressed in the Constitution
it must be held to embrace all controversies of a justiciable nature
arising within the territorial limits of the Nation, no matter who
may be the parties thereto." . . . "These considerations lead
to the propositions that when a legislative power is claimed for the
National Government the question is whether that power is one
of those granted by the Constitution, either in terms or by neces-
sary implication, whereas in respect to judicial functions the
question is whether there be any limitations expressed in the Con-
stitution on the general grant of national power."
In the same vein, the opinion thus disposes of the question as
to the meaning of the Tenth Amendment, in favor of the nation-
alist side of the controversy (p. 9o).
"The argument of counsel ignores the principal factor in this
article, to wit, 'the people.' Its principal purpose was not
the distribution of power between the United States and
the States, but a reservation to the people of all powers
not granted. The preamble of the Constitution declares
who framed it, 'we the people of the United States,'
not the people of one State, but the people of all the
States, and Article X reserves to the people of all the States
the powers not delegated to the United States. The powers affect-
ing the internal affairs of the States not granted to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, and all powers of a national
character which are not delegated to the National Government by
the Constitution are reserved to the people of the United States.
The people who adopted the Constitution knew that in the nature
of things they could not foresee all the questions which might
arise in the future, all the circumstances which might call for the
exercise of further national powers than those granted to the
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United States, and after making provisions for an amendment to
the Constitution by which any needed additional powers would
be granted, they reserved to themselves all poweres not so
delegated."
It may well be doubted whether some of the expressions which
have been quoted fully represent the views of the court. If taken
in their natural sense, they seem authority for the proposition that
every controversy which can properly be made the subject of a
law suit, and arises within the territorial limits of the United States,
no matter who may be the parties thereto, may be given over by
Congress for final disposition to the Federal courts. A suit, for
instance, on a note of hand made by a citizen of New York in
favor of and held by a citizen of New York, and there payable,
could, if Congress so willed, be maintained in the Circuit Court of
the United States, although no question of Federal right were in
any way involved in the cause of action or in the defence.
This result is reached by assuming that the entire judicial power
of the United States was granted by the Constitution in general
words to the courts of the United States and that this power com-
prised, except so far as limitations were elsewhere expressed, all
the judicial power which the new nation was capable of exercising.
A letter written by Jefferson during his last years contains this
passage:
"It has long, however, been my opinion, and I have never
shrunk from its expression, (although I do not choose to put it
into a newspaper, nor, like a Priam in armor, offer myself its
champion), that the germ of dissolution of our federal govern-
ment is in the constitution of the federal judiciary; an irresponsible
body (for impeachment is scarcely a scare-crow), working like
gravity by night and by day, gaining a little to-day and a little
to-morrow, and advancing its noiseless step like a thief, over the
field of jurisdiction, until all shall be usurped from the States,
and the government of all be consolidated into one. To this I
am opposed; because, when all government, domestic and foreign,
in little as in great things, shall be drawn to Washington as the
centre of all power, it will render powerless the checks provided
of one government on another, and will become as venal and
oppressive as the government from which we separated."
Had our third President lived to the present day, he would have
been apt to think that his forebodings were coming true.
7 The Works of Thomas Jefferson, Library Ed., XV, 331.
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It is, however, to be observed that none of the observations of
the court in Kansas v. Colorado which have been quoted related
to points vital to the decision.
The Constitution expressly declares that the judicial power
shall extend "to Controversies to which the United States shall
be a party," and "to Controversies between two or more States."
Kansas had a controversy with Colorado. They could not settle
it by fighting. The Constitution provided another and a peaceful
remedy. Kansas resorted to it. The action which she brought
involved a controversy in which the United States had or claimed
an interest. They therefore could properly seek to intervene as a
party, and were admitted, as such.
The original suit had on demurrer, several years before, been
held to be well brought, on the ground that that it presented a con-
troversy made justiciable by the Constitution, because it was a
controversy between States. Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U. S., 125,
141. There was nothing in the facts reported by the Commis-
sioner, to whom the cause had been referred, to shake this basis
of jurisdiction. It rested on the settled principle that there were
two grounds, on either of which a suit might be maintained in the
Federal courts; one where the cause of action was of a kind that
had been committed to their care; and one where the parties had
been made subject to their power.
The observations of Mr. Justice Brewer, in which it does not
appear that Mr. Justice White or Mr. Justice McKenna concurred,
and for which Mr. Justice Moody was under no responsibility,
(p. I i8) seem therefore fairly to fall within the category of obiter
dicta.
Chief Justice Marshall, in Cohens vs. Virginia (6 Wheaton, 264)
observed of one of his own greatest opinions, that while the de-
cision which it announced was right, he had taken positions in
the reasoning by which he had sought to support it which were
untenable. He then proceeded to say that the Constitution gave
the United States judicial power over all cases arising under the
Constitution or laws of the United States without respect to
parties. Many years afterwards the court declared that this last
remark was an obiter dicum, and not to be taken as authoritative
Hans vs. Lousiana, 134 U. S., I, 20. It would not be surprising if
Mr. Justice Brewer himself should, as years go on, find an oppor-
tunity to take the course so honorably followed by Marshall in
Cohens vs. Virginia. If the writer of a judicial opinion has per-
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mitted his pen to move too fast, and gone beyond the exigencies
of the case, it is the strength of our system of remedial justice
that his words lose their authority, as soon as the bounds of
necessity are passed.
Simeon E. Baldwin.
